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Abstract. In this paper, we focus on attacks and defense mechanisms
in additive reputation systems. We start by surveying the most impor-
tant protocols that aim to provide privacy between individual voters.
Then, we categorize attacks against additive reputation systems con-
sidering both malicious querying nodes and malicious reporting nodes
that collaborate in order to undermine the vote privacy of the remaining
users. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work that provides a
description of such malicious behavior under both semi-honest and ma-
licious model. In light of this analysis we demonstrate the inefficiencies
of existing protocols.
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1 Introduction
During the last few years, online communities have experienced a significant
amount of growth. Among the main factors contributing to their increased pop-
ularity is user-friendliness and ease of understanding but also accessibility and
availability of information and services. These characteristics make it easy, even
for novice users, to exchange information with strangers in way that guarantees
a certain degree of anonymity. However, these features can be abused by mali-
cious users who can either impersonate other entities and launch various types
of attacks under fake identities or provide negative feedback for well behaving
users, irrespective of the service they have received.
Reputation systems have been proposed as the means to protect online com-
munities from such malicious behavior. The main goal of a reputation system is
to reduce the risk involved in interactions between strangers by collecting, dis-
tributing and aggregating feedback about participants’ past behavior in order to
predict possible future behavior and identify dishonest community members [6].
However, one concern about reputation systems, which has received relatively
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little attention in the literature, is that of feedback providers’ privacy. Although
there are many reputation and trust establishment schemes, only some of them
deal with the problem of securing the votes or ratings of participating nodes. This
lack of privacy can lead to several problems including the proper functioning of
the network. For example, it has been observed in [5] that users of a reputation
system may avoid providing honest feedback in fear of retaliation, if reputation
scores cannot be computed in a privacy-preserving manner. Additionally, the
absence of schemes that provide (partial) privacy in decentralized environments,
such as ad hoc networks, is even larger.
Hence the development of reputation protocols that can be used to provide
anonymous feedback is essential to the survivability of online communities and
electronic marketplaces. In some sense, provision of anonymous feedback to a
reputation system is analogous to that of anonymous voting in electronic elec-
tions. It potentially encourages truthfulness by guaranteeing secrecy and freedom
from explicit or implicit influence. Although this freedom might be exploited by
dishonest feedback providers, who tend to report exaggerated feedbacks, it seems
highly beneficial for honest users, protecting the latter from being influenced by
malicious behavior [6].
In this invited paper we present a theoretical analysis of the vulnerabilities
of existing decentralized additive reputation systems, regarding the privacy of
individual votes. A decentralized system is one in which there is no central
repository to collect and report reputation scores. In such a system, the users
themselves are responsible for maintaining a local repository of trust ratings and
providing feedback when queried by other users. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first work that provides a description of malicious behavior/attacks
against such systems. We use this categorization to demonstrate the inefficiencies
of existing protocols in the hope to spawn further research in the area.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the problem of
secure trust aggregation and we define the basic terms that we use in the rest of
the paper. In Section 3 we present the details of the most important protocols
that allow ratings to be (partially) private in decentralized additive reputation
systems under the semi-honest model while in Section 4 we move one step further
and we present protocols that preserve voters privacy under the malicious model.
In Section 5, we present attacks that can break the privacy of the presented
protocols and in Section 6 we conclude the paper.
2 Problem Statement & Definitions
We start by providing a definition of decentralized additive reputation systems
as described in [6].
Definition 1: A Reputation System R is said to be a Decentralized Additive
Reputation System if it satisfies the following two requirements:
1. Feedback collection, combination and propagation are implemented in a de-
centralized way.
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2. Combination of feedbacks provided by nodes is calculated in an additive man-
ner.
Regarding trust management and the use of reputation schemes in networks,
we observe two general methods for collecting information on other nodes. Each
member of a network evaluates other nodes based on first-hand information (Di-
rect Trust) or second-hand (Third-Party Trust) information. A framework for
assessing trust between neighboring nodes is based on direct observations, while
trust between nodes that have no information from previous interactions, are
built through a combination of information from intermediate nodes. The prob-
lem (in its general form) of secure private voting in decentralized environments
is as follows:
Basic Problem Statement: A querying node Aq, receives a service request
from a target node At. Since Aq has incomplete information about At, she asks
other nodes in the network to give their votes about At. Let U = {U1, · · · , Un}
be the set of all nodes that will provide an opinion to Aq. The problem is to find
a way that each vote (vi) remains private while at the same time Aq would be in
position of understanding what voters, as a whole, believe about At, by evaluating
the sum of all votes (
∑n
i=1 vi).
While research in the direction of the semi-honest model has been very active
with numerous approaches presented and adopted, this is not the case for the
malicious model, which has not been studied extensively.
Semi-Honest Model: In the semi-honest adversarial model, even malicious
nodes correctly follow the protocol specification. However, malicious nodes over-
hear all messages and attempt to use them in order to learn information that
otherwise should remain private. Semi-honest adversaries are also called honest-
but-curious.
Malicious Model: In the malicious model, an adversary, not only can over-
hear all messages that are exchanged between nodes, but can also compromise
the correctness of the protocol. One way of achieving this, is by giving a non
valid vote (e.g vote that does not belong to a predefined interval), or by replacing
the intermediate computations of other nodes with fake ones, or even by voting
multiple times or not voting at all. So, the main aim of this model is not (only)
to break the privacy of a protocol, but mainly to make it nonfunctional.
Problem Statement Under the Malicious Model: The vote vi of each
Ui in U = {U1, · · · , Un} must remain private while at the same time, Aq must be
in position of verifying that each participant follows the protocol correctly. This
means that each Ui must be in position of proving that her vote vi is valid as well
as that they do not try to influence the correctness of the protocol by corrupting
data of other nodes.
All the protocols that are presented in this paper assume that the adversary
is semi-honest. For the following sections, we assume that each node (Aq, Ui,
i ∈ [1, n]) has generated a public/private key pair (kAq/KAq , kUi/KUi). The
private key is kept secret, while the public key is shared with the rest of the
nodes. The vote of Ui concerning At is denoted by vi.
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For the following sections, we assume that the reader is familiar with the
concept of public key cryptography. Let Gq be a group of prime order q, such
that computing discrete logarithms in Gq is infeasible. In addition, lets suppose
that via an appropriate public procedure, two generators (g,G) of Gq have been
selected. Each node (Aq, Ui, i ∈ [1, n]) has generated a private key KUi ∈R ∗q and
a public key kUi = G
KUi . The private key is kept secret, while the public key is
shared with the rest of the nodes1. These public keys will be used to secure com-
munications between the nodes, hence the communication lines between parties
are assumed to be secure. All the presented protocols also rely on the use of
homomorphic encryption2 for the collection of votes by the querying agent Aq.
The vote of Ui concerning At is denoted by vi.
Definition 1 (Homomorphic Encryption). Let E(.) be an encryption func-
tion. We say that E(.) is additive homomorphic iff for two messages m1,m2 the
following holds:
E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 +m2).
The notation E(.) will refer to the results of the application of an homomorphic
encryption function (as described in Definition 1) that Aq can decrypt with her
private key.
Apart from that, the protocols that provides defense mechanism under the
malicious model rely on secret verifying sharing (VSS) techniques.
Definition 2 (Verifiable Secret Sharing). As first introduced by B. Chor et
al. in [4] a VSS protocol consists of a two stage protocol. Informally, there are
n participants, m (m < n) of which may be compromised and deviate from the
protocol. One of the participants is considered as the dealer who holds a secret
value s. In the first stage, the dealer commits to a unique value v and it always
holds v = s if the dealer is honest. In the second stage, the already committed
value v will be recovered by all good participants, no matter what the compromised
participants might do.
3 Protocols Under the Semi-Honest Model
3.1 Pavlov et al. Protocols [6]
Pavlov et al. [6] showed that there are limits on supporting perfect privacy in
decentralized reputation systems. More precisely, they showed that when n− 1
1 Key distribution techniques have already been extensively discussed in security liter-
ature regarding decentralized environments (e.g P2P and Ad Hoc Networks). Here,
the focus is more on the privacy challenges associated with the collection and ag-
gregation of votes.
2 Pailler’s Cryptosystem [3] is an example of cryptosystem where the trapdoor mech-
anism is based on a homomorphic function.
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dishonest peers collude with the querying node to reveal the reputation rating
of the remaining honest node then perfect privacy is not feasible. In addition,
they suggested a probabilistic scheme for peers selection to ensure that such a
scenario will occur with small probability and they proposed three protocols3
that allow ratings to be privately provided in decentralized additive reputation
systems.
Protocol 1 (Figure 1(a)) During the initialization step, Aq creates the set
U with all voters, orders them in a circle: Aq → U1 → · · · → Un and sends to
each Ui the identity of his successor in the circle. Next, Aq generates a random
number rq such that rq 6= 0 and sends it to the first node in the circle, U1. Upon
reception, U1 adds his vote v1 and sends to his successor the sum rq + v1. Each
remaining node in the list follows the same procedure. Finally, the last node will
send back to Aq the sum rq +
∑n
i=0 vi. Upon reception, Aq will subtract rq and
will divide the remaining number by n. The result will be the average of all votes
in the set U .
(a) First Protocol (b) Second Protocol
Fig. 1. Pavlov et al. protocols
Protocol 2 (Figure 1(b)) During the initialization step, Aq creates the set
U , sends to each Ui, i ∈ [1, n] the whole list U and generates a random number
rq such that rq 6= 0. Each of the n + 1 nodes (including Aq) split their votes
(Aq splits rq = rq,1 + · · · + rq,n) into n + 1 shares in the following way: Ui
chooses n random numbers ri,1, · · · , ri,n such that vi = ri,1 + · · · + ri,n and
calculates ri = rq,i −
∑n
k=1 ri,k. He keeps ri and sends ri,1, · · · , ri,n to the n
other nodes, such that each node Uj receives ri,j . At the next step, each Uj
calculates valj =
∑n
i=1(ri,j) + rj and sends valj to Aq. Upon reception, Aq
3 The first two protocols corresponds to the semi-honest model, while the third targets
the malicious model, thus it is presented in Subsection 4.1.
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calculates the sum of n votes
∑n
i=1(vali)−rq, divides by n and finds the average
of votes.
3.2 k-Shares Protocol [8]
Hasan et al. [8] proposed a privacy preserving reputation protocol under the
semi-honest model. The authors were inspired from the second Pavlov protocol
and their goal was to reduce the message complexity to O(n). It’s main difference
from the protocol of Section 3.1 is that each user Ui sends its shares to at most
k < n − 1 “trustworthy” agents whose behavior in the context of preserving
privacy can be “assured” by Ui.
During initialization, Aq sends to each Ui the whole list U . Each Ui selects up
to k nodes from U in such a way that the probability that all the selected nodes
will collude to break Ui’s privacy, is low. Let Ai = {Um, · · · , Um+k} be the k
nodes that were selected by Ui. At this point, Ui prepares k+1 shares as follows:
The first k shares are random numbers (ri,1, · · · , ri,n) uniformly distributed over
a large interval while the last one is selected such that: vi =
∑n+1
j=1 ri,j . Ui sends
to Aq the set Ai and sends ri,j to each Uj , j ∈ [m,m + k]. At this point Aq
has also received the Ai sets and can, thus, calculate the list of nodes that each
Ui should expect to receive shares from. Aq sends this list to each Ui which in
turns proceeds to receive shares from the nodes of the list that Aq provided with.
Ui computes the sum of all shares that were received as well as his own share
ri,k+1. The last step for each voter is to send back to Aq the previous calculated
sum σi. Aq calculates the sum
∑n
i=1 σi and divides it by n in order to find the
average of all the votes.
3.3 Dolev et al. Protocols
S. Dolev et al. [9] proposed four decentralized schemes where the number of
messages exchanged is proportional to the number of participants. The first two
protocols (AP and WAP protocol) assume that Aq is not compromised while
the next two protocols, namely MPKP and MPWP assume that any node that
participates in the protocol can act maliciously.
Apart from that, all the proposed schemes are based heavily on a secure
homomorphic cryptosystem. More precisely, the AP and WAP protocols are
based on the Paillier cryptosystem [3], while MPKP and MPWP are based on
the Benaloh cryptosystem [2].
Multiple Private Keys Protocol (MPKP) During initialization, Aq creates
two (1× n) vectors. The trust vector TV = [1 . . . 1] and the accumulated vector
AV = [1 . . . 1]. In addition, she creates an accumulated variable σ with initial
value equal to 1.
MPKP is divided into two rounds. During the first round each Ui splits
his vote vi in n-shares (ri,1, · · · , ri,n). More precisely, Ui selects his n-shares at
random such that vi =
∑n
j=1 ri,j , encrypts each ri,j with the public key kj of
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Fig. 2. Basic Steps of MPWP Protocol
user Uj and multiplies it with AV [j]. At the end of the first round we will have
that AV =
[∏n





At this point, the second round begins. Each Ui decrypts AV [i] with his
private key KUi , finds
∑n
j=1 rj,i, encrypts it with the public key kAq of Aq and
adds the encrypted value to σ. Furthermore, he deletes the i-th entry and sends
the updated TV vector to the next node in U . At the last step, Aq will receive∏n
i=1E(
∑n
j=1 ri,j) which decrypts it, divides it by n and finds the average of
the votes.
Multiple Private Keys Weighted Protocol (MPWP - Figure 2) This is
the weighted version of MPKP protocol where the weights wi correspond to the
trust level that Aq has assigned to each Ui, respectively. MPWP computes the
weighted average of votes that are given by each individual Ui.
At the initialization stage,Aq creates a (1×n) vector TV = [E(w1) . . . E(wn)],
where wi, i ∈ [1, n] is the trust level of Ui. Additionally, Aq initializes a (n× n)
matrix of shares T , where
T =
1 1 . . . 1... ... . . . ...
1 1 . . . 1

and sets the accumulated value σ = 1. Aq sends to each Ui the TV vector and the
matrix T . Upon reception, each Ui generates a random number ri and calculates
E(wi)
viri. Then he adds it to σ by calculating σ = σ ·E(wi)viri and deletes the
corresponding entry from TV . At this point, Ui shares his random number ri by
replacing the i-th row of T with Si =
[
{ri,1}k1 . . . {ri,n}kn
]
. At the end of the




and the updated shares matrix T , where
T =
 {r1,1}k1 {r1,2}k2 . . . {r1,n}kn... ... . . . ...
{rn,1}k1 {rn,2}k2 . . . {rn,n}kn
 .
Aq, by decrypting TV will obtain
∑n
i=1 wivi + ri.
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So, at this point Aq knows the sum of all weighted votes along with the
random numbers. This means that she needs to subtract
∑n
i=1 ri in order to
calculate the average votes. In order to do so, a second round of the protocol be-
gins where each Ui receives T , decrypts T [][i] with KUi and calculates
∑n
j=1 rj,i.
Then he encrypts it with kAq , adds it to σ and deletes the i-th column from




j=1 rj,i), which decrypts with KAq
and finds the sum of all random numbers. Finally, she subtracts the result from
TV and finds the weighted average of the votes.
4 Protocols Under the Malicious Model
The main drawback of the protocols described in the previous section is the
fact that they are effective only under the not-so-realistic semi-honest model.
However, if we wish to impede real malicious behaviors, we have to build pro-
tocols that will assume that every adversary acts under the malicious model. It
is obvious that in comparison to the semi-honest model, secure protocols within
the malicious model enhance security. However it is important to note that a
malicious model may provide tighter security, at a greater computational cost.
In this section we are presenting four protocols that try to overcome the problem
of secure (and private) voting in decentralized systems.
4.1 Pavlov et al. Protocol [6]
The goal of this protocol is to ensure that reputation ratings lie within a pre-
defined range. It uses Pederson’s [1] verifiable secret sharing scheme to support
validity checking of the feedback values provided by voters.
The authors assume that the values of votes vi are integers in the Gq group
of prime order q. In the initialization step, Aq selects a group Gq of a large prime
order q with generators g and h, where loggh is hard to find. Then she sends to
each Ui the list U of all nodes along with g and h.
Each Ui creates two polynomials of degree n: p






· · ·+ pi0xn such that vi = pi0 and qi(x) = qi0 + qi1x+ qi0x2 + · · ·+ qi0xn where all
coefficients, except pi0 are chosen uniformly at random from Gq.
Ui sends to each node Uj , j ∈ [1, i) ∪ (i, n + 1] (Un+1 node is considered as
Aq) p
i(j) and qi(j). Apart from that, in order to make the above mentioned
shares verifiable, Ui also publishes the commitments
4 Cj = g
pijhq
i
j of the coeffi-
cients. Each Uj upon reception of p
1(j), p2(j), · · · , pj−1(j), pj+1(j), · · · , pn(j)
and q1(j), q2(j), · · · , qj−1(j), qj+1(j), · · · , qn(j), calculates pj(j), qj(j), sm =∑n
i=1 p
i(j) and tm =
∑n
i=1 q








4 The main idea of a commitment scheme is that given a commitment commit(A),
one has no idea about the exact value of A. Apart from that, based on the discrete
logarithm problem it is hard to find A′ : commit(A) = commit(A′), A 6= A′.
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Fig. 3. k-Shares Protocol for the Malicious Model
Upon reception of s1, · · · , sn and t1, · · · , tn, Aq obtains s(0), where s(x) =∑n
i=1 p
i(x) in the following manner: it computes
∑n+1
i=1 siLi(0), where Li(0) is
the Lagrange polynomial at 0 and in this case could be expressed by Li(0) =∏n+1
j=1,j 6=i
j
j − i .
4.2 k-Shares Protocol for the Malicious Model (Figure 3)
During the initialization step, Aq sends the list U to each Ui. Each Ui selects up
to k other nodes in U in such a way that the probability that all of the selected
nodes will collude to break Ui’s privacy is low. In other words, in this step, each
Ui tries to select k trustworthy voters.
Then, Ui creates k + 1 shares (ri,1, . . . , ri,k+1) such that the first k shares
are random numbers uniformly distributed over a large interval. The last share
is equal with: ri,k+1 = (vi −
∑k
j=1 ri,j) mod M where M is a publicly known
modulus. After the calculation of the shares, Ui encrypts the k + 1 shares
with her public key and obtains
〈
{ri,1}kUi , . . . , {ri,k+1}kUi
〉
. Then she also en-
crypts the first k shares with the public key of the corresponding node to obtain〈
{ri,1}kU1 , . . . , {ri,k}kUk
〉
.
At this point, Ui is responsible for the generation of two non-interactive zero
knowledge proofs in order for the shares as well as the vote itself to be tested
for their validity. So, Ui computes:
βi =
(
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and creates a zero knowledge proof of set membership5 smzkp(βi, A) where
A is the interval in which a valid vote should belong to. Ui then generates k non-
interactive plaintext equality zero zero knowledge proofs6. Each proof contains




, where j ∈
[1, k] and verifies that the two cipehertexts encrypt the same plaintext. With
this way, a verifier can be sure that the shares she received are correct.
Ui sends
〈




{ri,1}kU1 , . . . , {ri,k}kUk
〉
as well





Upon reception, Aq calculates βi on her own and verifies the proofs received
from Ui. If the verification is correct, she sends the encrypted shares she received
to the corresponding nodes in U . Each Ui that received the encrypted shares from





by using the additive homomorphic property
and with her private key decrypts γi and finds the sum of all received shares
σi =
∑k+1
j=1 ri,j . Then, Ui encrypts σi with kq, creates a non-interactive plaintext




and sends them to Aq. Aq
first computes γi and then verifies the zero knowledge proof. In the case where
the verification of the proofs are correct, which means that Aq has received the
shares correctly and she has also calculated γi correctly, Aq decrypts each {σi}kq
and finds the sum of all votes by computing the following
∑k
i=1 σi.
4.3 Dolev et al. Protocols for Malicious Adversaries [10]
S. Dolev et al. presented two decentralized protocols, namely PKEBP and
CEBP, that provides partial resistant against malicious users by the mean that
Aq can check the validity of votes.
Public Key Encryption Based Protocol (PKEBP - Figure 4): During
initialization, Aq creates a (1×n) vector and initializes it TV = [1 . . . n]. PKEBP
is divided into two rounds. During the first round, Aq sends TV to all nodes in U .
Upon reception, each Ui encrypts her vote with the public key of Aq, sets TV [i] =
{vi}kAq and sends the updated vector to Ui+1. The result of the first round is a
new vector with a sequence of encrypted elements: TV ′ =
[
{v1}kAq . . . {vn}kAq
]
.
The second round of PKEBP is performed when TV ′ returns from Un to U1
(Aq is bypassed in this round). Each Ui performs a random permutation pi of her
i − th entry with another entry from the vector and sends the updated vector
5 A zero knowledge proof of set membership denoted as smzkp(E(mi), A), shows
that an ecryption of a message mi encrypts an element/message from set A :=
{m1, . . . ,mp}.
6 Let E1(m) and E2(m) be encryptions of a message m with two different public
keys. A zero knowledge proof of plaintext, allows a prover to convince a verifier that
D1(E1(m)) = m = D2(E2(m)), where D(.) is a decryption function.
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Fig. 4. Public Key Encryption Based Protocol
to Ui+1. At the end of round two, Un sends to Aq the final vector. Aq decrypts
each element with her private key and computes the sum of all votes.
Commutative Encryption Based Protocol (CEBP): CEBP is based on
commutative encryption. During initialization, Aq creates a (1 × n) vector and
initializes it TV = [1 . . . n]. CEBP is divided into three rounds. During the first
round, Aq sends TV to all nodes in U . Upon reception, each Ui encrypts her




and sends the updated vector TV ′ to Ui+1.
In the second round, each Ui encrypts all entries of TV
′, except the i − th
that she had encrypted in the previous round, and sends the updated vector to
Ui+1. This means that at the end of the second round each entry of the vector
will be encrypted with the following keys: kU1 , kU2 , . . . , kUn , kAq .
During the third round, each Ui randomly permutes the i − th entry of the
vector and decrypts all the entries with KUi . So, at the end of this round, Aq
will receive a vector that contains all the individual votes, encrypted with kAq
and in a random order. Upon reception, Aq decrypts each value and finds the
sum of the n votes.
5 Vulnerabilities/Inefficiencies of Reviewed Systems
In this section we describe and categorize the various types of attacks that aim
to break the privacy of the above mentioned schemes. All the attacks that are
presented in the Section 5.1 assume that the adversary is semi-honest. Then, in
Section 5.2, we provide a comparison between the protocols that preserve privacy
under the malicious model and we expose their inefficiencies.
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5.1 Attacks
In all the cases, we assume that Aq is malicious and can overhear every message
that is exchanged between voters. If we do not make this assumption, the problem
of trust aggregation has a trivial solution.
Fig. 5. Querying Node Attack
1. Querying Node Attack (Figure 5): In this attack, the only malicious
node is Aq, which can overhear all messages that are sent between voters.
Affected Protocols: Pavlov Protocols 1, 2 and 3, k-shares protocol, Dolev
protocols AP and WAP.
• Querying Node Attack at Pavlov Protocol 1: Aq has generated a
random number rq at the beginning of the protocol and voters are adding
their votes to that number one by one. This means that Aq can find each
individual vote by overhearing every message, since she knows rq.
• Querying Node Attack at Pavlov Protocols 2, 3 & k-Shares Pro-
tocol: The random numbers that each node generates do not really offer
any protection from Aq or from any other curious adversary who over-
hears the channel. This is because the parts of the random numbers that
are exchanged among the nodes are not encrypted in any way.
• Querying Node Attack at AP & WP: Since all messages are en-
crypted with kAq and the voters do not use random numbers, Aq can still
decrypt each message one by one in order to find the individual votes for
every Ui, i ∈ [1, n].
2. Alone in the List Attack (Figure 6): If Aq is malicious she can ask each
node from U to give their vote separately. By doing so, she will be able to
find the value of all individual votes and thus easily break their privacy.
Affected Protocols: All protocols
• Analysis: Normally, Aq receives a sum of votes and that is the reason
why she cannot understand the exact vote of each Ui. In the case where
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Fig. 6. Alone in the List Attack
Aq asks each Ui to vote individually (size of U is equal to 1), she receives
one vote at a time. Thus she knows the vote of each voter.
Fig. 7. Sandwich Attack
3. Sandwich Attack (Figure 7): In this scenario, Aq is considered as mali-
cious and arranges the nodes in U in such a way that all U2k+1 or U2k, k ∈ N
nodes are malicious. By doing so, Aq can use values from adjacent malicious
nodes to calculate the random number of the legitimate node situated be-
tween them, thus finding all the individual votes in the set. This attack is
effective on protocols where each node is sending either a random number
that she has generated either a share of her vote to the next node in U .
Affected Protocols: Pavlov Protocols 1 2 and 3, k-Shares protocol, AP,
WAP.
• Sandwich Attack at Pavlov Protocol 1: Even if Aq could not overhear
all messages, he could cooperate with every malicious voter in order to
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find the votes of the rest nodes. More precisely, each malicious user would
inform Aq about his vote as well as the sum that he received from the
previous node. Upon reception,Aq would subtract the vote of the malicious
node and the random number rq that he generated at the initialization
step. The result would be the vote of the previous node.
• Sandwich Attack at Pavlov Protocols 2, k-Shares protocol: As
we mentioned before, the random numbers are not encrypted with any
key which means that the whole information is known to everyone who
overhears the channel. The cooperation between malicious voters and Aq
is not essential, since Aq can find the votes on his own.
• Sandwich Attack at AP & WP: In both cases, the sum of votes is
encrypted with the public key of Aq and each Ui adds his vote to the
previous one, by using the homomorphic property of the underlying cryp-
tosystem. Even though votes are encrypted this time, the encryption does
not offer any kind of protection if Aq is adversarial. Also in this case, the
cooperation between malicious voters and Aq is not essential, since Aq can
find the votes on her own.
• Sandwich Attack at PKEBP: The minimum requirements in order for
a sandwich attack to be effective in PKEBP protocol is when Aq and at
least one node from Uc = {U1, U2, Un−1, Un} (preferably Un) collude.
– Aq colludes with Un: At the end of the first round Un receives TV
that contains all the individual votes encrypted with kAq . Un sends TV
to Aq and she decrypts one by one each element of TV in order to find
all the individual votes. This means that even before the end of the
second round, Aq will have totally break the privacy of the protocol.
– Aq colludes with U1: At the beginning of the second round, U1, re-
ceives TV that contains all the individual votes encrypted with kAq . Un
sends TV to Aq and she decrypts one by one each element of TV in
order to find all the individual votes.
– Aq colludes with U2 or Un−1: Lets suppose that Aq colludes with
Un−1 (the case for U2 is identical). Before the end of first round Aq will
receive TV from Un−1. This means that she will effectively compute the
first n−1 votes. At the end of first round where Aq will receive the final
vector, she will find the missing vote.
• MPKP & MPWP Resistance to Sandwich Attack: We assume that
Aq and U2k+1, k ∈ N are malicious (U1, U3, U5, etc). After the first round,
malicious nodes will be aware of v2k+1, r2k+1,i, r2k,2k+1, k ∈ N, i ∈ [1, n]
values. At the end of the second round, Aq will be aware of the following:
a)
∑n




i=1 ri,1, · · · ,
∑n
i=1 ri,n. Since every node adds
∑n
j=1 rj,i to E(.), Aq
can find each individual sum.
Table 1 shows a list of what Aq knows at the end of the protocol and what
information she is missing. By using these values, Aq cannot find the in-
dividual votes from the legitimate voters. The only thing she can do is to
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approximately calculate the values since she knows that each vote vi is
bounded from α and β. This is a legitimate assumption since Dolev et al.
made the additional requirement that the homomorphic modulus, m must
be identical for all users. This is possible under the Benaloh cryptosystem
[2], however, decryption can only be performed by trying all possible val-
ues and finding the unique value that decrypts correctly. Furthermore, a
(degenerate version of a) sandwich attack can be successfully lunched only
in the case where n − 1 nodes are compromised (as Dolev et al. mention
in their paper).
Table 1. Information that Aq has gained at the end of the second round
v1 r1,1 r1,2 r1,3 r1,4 · · · r1,n
r2,1 r2,3 · · · r2,n
v3 r3,1 r3,2 r3,3 r3,4 · · · r3,n





... · · ·
...
vn rn,1 rn,2 rn,3 rn,4 · · · rn,n
The weaknesses of the described protocols are summarized in Table 2.
5.2 Inefficiencies of Protocols Under the Malicious Model
In this subsection, we make a brief comparison between the protocols presented
in Section 4.
◦ The main disadvantage of Pavlov’s protocol is the communication complexity.
More precisely, it requires O(n3) messages to be exchanged between nodes
that take part in the voting procedure. In addition, there is an insufficient
description of the protocol. For example, there is no explanation regarding
the zero-knowledge proofs that the protocol requires. Also, it is not clear at
all if a vote can belong to any interval [a, b] or should be bounded to a smaller
one (e.g [−1, 1]). This would change the required computations for the verifier
of a vote. As a result, and taking into consideration the poor explanation of
crucial parts of the protocol, it is not clear whether it is open to mistakes or
not.
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Table 2. Protocols Summary – Resistance to Attacks
Querying Alone in the List Sandwich
Pavlov 1 NO NO NO
Pavlov 2 NO NO NO
Pavlov 3 YES NO YES
k Shares NO NO NO
AP NO NO NO
WAP NO NO NO
MPKP YES NO YES
k Shares Malicious YES NO YES
CEBP YES NO YES
PKEBP YES NO NO
CEBP YES NO YES
◦ k-Shares protocol even though it works with a lower complexity than Pavlov’s
protocol, it has two basic drawbacks. First, the query agent Aq acts like a cen-
tral authority since all messages are transfered to her and then she forwards
them to the actual receivers. Second, in order for every node to be able to val-
idate the shares as well as the submitted votes, the protocol makes use of non-
interactive zero knowledge proofs. More precisely, O(n) non-interactive zero
knowledge proofs of set membership and O(n) non-interactive zero knowledge
proofs of plaintext equality are required. The use of such techniques, guaran-
tees security (in the sense that the submitted data are valid) but with a higher
computational cost, which is not captured in the description of the protocol.
◦ In CEPB protocol, Aq can validate the submitted vote very easily since at the
last round, she receives a list with all the individual votes in a random order.
With this way, on one hand authors manage to avoid the complex computa-
tions of zero knowledge proofs but on the other their protocol is using commu-
tative encryption schemes, like the Pohlig-Hellman scheme [11] which is based
on the assumption of the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem.
However, not only Pohlig-Hellman, but the existing commutative encryption
schemes in general does not provide formal methods of security [12], and may
lead to security breaches in real world applications. More precisely, in [13] it is
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shown that Polhig-Hellman encryption scheme, preserves certain attributes of
the plaintext. As a result, by matching the characteristics of the plaintext and
the ciphertext, the original value of set of encrypted values can be identified.
6 Conclusions
In this invited paper, we have presented a series of protocols aiming to provide
privacy between individual voters in an additive reputation system. We have
analyzed these protocols in order to see how they react when honest-but-curious
nodes try to break the privacy and find the individual votes of other nodes. To
this end, we have provided a description of malicious behaviors/attacks against
these protocols by utilizing three different attack scenarios. Additionally, we
showed that none of the existing protocols can build defensive mechanisms that
provide resistance against all possible attacks. More precisely, all protocols are
vulnerable to an “alone in the list” attack which may be the most difficult attack
to handle.
We are currently working on the design of a decentralized privacy preserving
scheme that will provide effective defense mechanisms against the type of attacks
described above.
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